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General Aviation Weather Encounter Case Studies
Introduction

pilot causal factors. We conclude with recommendations
for GA pilot education and training on flight weather
hazards, the best use of weather information products,
and sources for those products.

Over the last 20 years, nearly 40,000 general aviation
(GA) aircraft have been involved in accidents, of which
roughly 20% involved fatalities (Shappell & Wiegmann,
2009). Notably, many of those fatal accidents involved
encounters with adverse weather (Detwiler et al., 2006;
NTSB, 2005; Wiegmann et al., 2005).  According to
the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA)
Air Safety Foundation (2005), about 70% of weatherinduced accidents are fatal.  Because GA aircraft tend
to be smaller, slower, and flown at lower altitudes than
transport-category aircraft, they are more vulnerable to
hazards posed by the weather. Studies indicate that GA
pilots may also be less likely to have access to good weather
information (Burian, 2002; Knecht, 2008a, 2008b;
Latorella, Lane, & Garland, 2002; Petty & Floyd, 2004). 
As a result of the differences between GA and transport
aviation, weather-related GA accidents have attracted a
great deal of attention from governmental agencies such
as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
academic researchers. 
Most research on weather-related GA accidents has
focused on three key areas: 1) identifying the factors associated with weather-related accidents; 2) identifying
the pilot decision-making processes that contribute to
weather-related accidents; and 3) understanding how new
technologies could contribute to improved pilot decisionmaking (NTSB, 1968, 1974, 2005, 2007; O’Hare &
Smitheram, 1995; Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2001). 
The present study focuses on the first two key areas
outlined above by analyzing and compiling the results
of 24 case studies of GA weather encounters over the
continental U.S. The project team used a combination of
pilot interviews and a detailed analysis of the atmospheric
conditions during the time and location of each weather
encounter using archived meteorological data from the
National Climatic Data Center. A complementary paper
(Shappell et al., 2010) describes the details of the study
methodology (i.e., interview template and data compilation) and discusses pilot human factors for the weather
encounters.  This paper will discuss the methodology
for collection and analysis of pertinent weather data for
the set of weather encounters, the results of our case
analyses, and development of a model for examining
weather-related encounters that combines weather and

Methodology
The study consists of two main parts: pilot interviews
and analysis of the weather encounters for each interview
case. In the first portion of the study, we interviewed 26
GA pilots who had experienced a weather-related deviation, requested flight assistance, made an emergency
declaration, or had an incident over a 25-month period. 
The roughly one-hour interview was developed using
surveys previously employed by NASA and the FAA
(Knecht, 2008a, 2008b; NASA, 2007). The interview
protocol examined each pilot’s background and flight
experience, and elicited details of the encounter such as
pre-flight preparations (including sources and types of
weather products used), weather hazard(s) experienced,
and the actions taken by the pilot. Table 1 outlines a brief
description of each section of the structured interview. 
In the second portion of the study, we attempted to
determine the atmospheric conditions during the time
and location of each weather encounter. For each weather
encounter described in the interview, we accessed archived
meteorological data from the National Climatic Data Center (see http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/land.html#dandp
for a link to the various collections of land-based archived
data available).  We collected relevant aviation routine
weather reports (METARs), terminal aerodrome forecasts
(TAFs), airmen’s meteorological information (AIRMETs),
significant meteorological information/advisories (SIGMETs), and appropriate precipitation reflectivity fields
from the National Weather Service’s Doppler Radar
network (NEXRAD).  The METARs and TAFs were
collected for the departure, destination, and encounter/
diversion times and locations in each case. The AIRMETs,
SIGMETs, and radar data were collected along the routes
and times of each flight and included the encounter times
and locations in each case. 
During the initial portion of the investigation, we
focused our analysis on the METAR data for each case
using the following protocol:
1. Examined the METAR available for the departure
location/time.
2.  Examined the closest METAR available at the
location/time of the weather encounter.
1

Table 1. Structured Interview Outline.
Aircraft Demographics
Pilot Demographics
Event Information
Preflight Planning

Enroute decision-making

Pilots were asked standard demographic questions such as what type of
aircraft they were flying at the time of the weather encounter and whether
they leased, partially, or fully owned the aircraft.
In addition to traditional demographic questions such as education,
profession, gender, and age, several items regarding piloting experience
and training were asked of the pilots.
Pilots were asked to describe their weather encounter in detail. Several
additional demographic questions related to the flight were also asked to
determine possible human causal factors for the encounter.
Of particular interest in this study was the method of preflight weather
planning employed by the pilots. Toward these ends, pilots were asked to
describe their normal method of preflight planning and whether it was
different the day of the weather encounter.
Because all participants encountered adverse weather, several questions
were asked regarding their enroute decision-making, especially with
regard to utilization of enroute flight services.

Table 2. Flight Phase When Weather Encountered.
Takeoff/Climb
1

Cruise
19

Descent/Maneuver
2

Approach/Landing
2

Table 3. Weather Hazards by Flight Phase.

IMC
Icing
Nonconvective
Turbulence
Convective
MVFR

Takeoff/Climb
1
0

Cruise
10
9

Descent/Maneuver
1
1

Approach/Landing
0
0

Total
Encounters
12
10

0
0
0

1
2
2

0
0
0

0
2
0

1
4
2

3. Examined the METAR available for the intended
destination at the time of departure and the METAR
at the actual destination/diversion location at the time
of arrival. 
Of the 24 cases1 used in this study, 18 flights took off
in visual meteorological conditions (VMC), five took
off under marginal visual flight rules (MVFR), and one
took off under instrument flight rules (IFR). When the
24 cases were stratified by phase of flight (Table 2), we
saw that the majority of these encounters (19) took place
during the cruise phase.  So while METARs are most
useful for examining the terminal weather at departure
1
Two cases were discarded because in one interview it came to light
that the pilot never actually had a weather encounter (i.e., did not
meet our research criteria); in a second case, there was insufficient
information upon which to perform a detailed case analysis.

and destination/diversion locations, they have limited
utility for those encounters that took place during the
cruise and descent/maneuver phases of the flight.  Initially, we collected and analyzed the METARs closest to
the encounter time/location to give us a “proxy” for the
conditions actually encountered by the pilot. However,
using a METAR to represent conditions at cruise altitude
(which varied tremendously between cases) violates the
purpose of the METAR as an indicator of the weather
conditions in the immediate vicinity of the aerodrome. 
This led us to collect additional data types, which we
will describe shortly. 
We also developed a distribution of the types of hazards the pilots experienced. In most cases, it was a single
hazard, but five cases had multiple hazards. These are
summarized by phase of flight in Table 3.
2     

Figure 1. Ceiling/Visibility as causal weather factor stratified by flight phase.

Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and icing
were the two most frequently encountered hazards by the
pilots in our sample, and these occurred predominantly
during the cruise phase. Notice that we included a category
called MVFR in our dataset to account for two cases in
which pilots encountered deteriorating visibility in the
cruise phase, which was not technically IFR, yet caused
them to make a divert decision. While the small sample
size limits any significant statistical analysis, our results
are consistent with those of previous studies (e.g., NTSB
(2005), see p. 21 and their Figure 6). 
The results are also consistent with a separate statistical analysis of GA accidents for the 2000-2006 period
retrieved from the NTSB accident/incident database. 
This statistical analysis was conducted to uncover patterns
related to GA weather-related accidents. The methodology
was a data mining of the NTSB database and collected

the various weather codes used as causal factors into broad
categories such as ceiling/visibility, icing, turbulence,
convective weather, and non-convective winds. Occurrence frequency statistics and graphs were developed
from the accident data. Using this categorical approach,
we found that incidents involving ceiling/visibility and
icing as causal factors occurred most frequently during
the cruise phase of flight (Figures 1 and 2). A Chi-Square
statistical significance test applied to the ceiling/visibility
and icing datasets indicates that for these weather factors, the number of accidents is not independent of the
various phases of flight.
Based on the hazard and flight-phase analysis shown
in Table 3, we began investigating additional types of
weather information that could give us insights into the
atmospheric conditions that occurred at the times and
locations of the 24 interview cases. 
1
3

Figure 2. Icing as causal weather factor by flight phase.

We analyzed available AIRMETs and SIGMETs to
determine if there were advisories in effect along the
route and during the time of each flight.2 For example,
an AIRMET for either IFR or mountain obscuration
(MTOS) could be used to infer a higher-than-normal
likelihood that a pilot could encounter IMC on the route
of flight, since AIRMETs are issued if over 50% of an
area is expected to be affected at one time.3 Additionally,
we analyzed Level II NEXRAD base reflectivity data to
determine if radar echoes were observed at the time and
location of the encounter. These additional data sources
serve two purposes: 1) corroboration of the atmospheric
conditions along the route and at the time and place of the
hazard encounter; and 2) knowledge about the weather
information that was available before and during the flight
(of which the pilot may or may not have been aware). 
The presence of radar echoes gives us a near real-time
2

For icing and turbulence AIRMETs and SIGMETs that would have
included pertinent flight levels, we did not make an attempt to verify
whether the flight level of the encounter matched the appropriate
AIRMET/SIGMET flight level, because we were more interested in
the presence of the hazard in the vicinity and time of the encounter.
3

See http://www.aviationweather.gov/exp/product_overlay/help/
p-airmets.html for detailed AIRMET criteria. 

“picture” of conditions over the weather-encounter location. We employed base reflectivity (0.5 degree elevation
angle) to account for precipitation occurring at relatively
low altitudes, since many of these flights took place at
altitudes lower than those of commercial aircraft. This
method involves some subjectivity by the researchers,
since the altitude of detected precipitation is a function
of the distance from the radar, the radar does not sample
100% of a volume scanned, and we did not have exact
flight levels and locations for every hazard encountered
in the dataset. Despite these limitations, the radar data
confirmed the presence of precipitation-producing clouds,
implying regions of upward vertical motion (likely to have
turbulence), and if air temperatures were between 0°C
and -20°C, the potential for aircraft icing.
Once we had established the types of weather data to
be collected for each encounter, the task was to determine
how to utilize the data to reconstruct the conditions that
each pilot experienced during flight. Our approach was
to adapt an unpublished model proposed by M. Lenz for
addressing weather-related incidents (personal communication, July 6, 2009). The model classified the weather
2
encounter into the following categories:
4     

Table 4. Weather Categorization for Each of the Flight Hazards Encountered in the
24 Interview Cases.
Hazard/# cases

Obs Network
detected Y/N

Wx Product(s)
accurate/
inaccurate/
non-existent

AIR/SIGMET
issued for
time/location

NEXRAD echoes
at time/location

IMC - 12 cases

9 - Yes / 3 - No

9/0/3

9

6

Icing - 10 cases

9 - Yes / 1 - No

9/0/1

6

6

Non-convective
Turbulence - 1 case

0 - Yes / 1 - No

0/0/1

0

1

Convective Wx - 4 cases
(note 1)

4 - Yes / 0 - No

3/1/0

3

1

"MVFR" - 2 cases (note
2)

2 - Yes / 0 - No

2/0/0

1

0

Total: 29 cases (note 3)

24 - Yes / 5 - No

23 / 1 / 5

19

14

Note 1 -Two of the four convective weather cases also included turbulence, so these are characterized as Convectively Induced
Turbulence
Note 2 – “MVFR” refers to cases where in-flight visibility dropped to within 3-5 miles, so technically not IMC
Note 3 – Total cases > # interview cases because some were multiple hazard encounters

1.  Weather hazard was detected/undetected by the
observational network
2. Weather hazard product was existent/non-existent
3. Existent weather hazard product was accurate/inaccurate (not applicable if hazard not detected)
4.  Pilot obtained/did not obtain existent weather
product

Analysis

non-existent; the number of cases for which an AIRMET/
SIGMET had been issued during the time of and along
the route of flight, up to and including the time of the
encounter; and whether radar echoes were observed for
the encounter time/location, as best as we were able to
discern from the interview information. An implicit assumption in this analysis is that the presence of the hazard
is indicated by the AIR/SIGMET, METAR/TAF (for
those encounters in the non-cruise flight phase), and/or
PIREP. While the NEXRAD data were important from
the point of view of filling in missing information at the
encounter time and location, we consider it to be a secondary product in as much as it is open to interpretation. 
We produced this matrix for IMC, icing, turbulence,
convective weather, and MVFR, along with a discussion
of each. Note that because several cases included multiple
hazards encountered by the pilot, there are more total
encounters than cases.

Based on the methodology above and the details of
the 24 interviews, we produced summary matrix for each
weather hazard (Table 4). The table describes whether
the hazard was detected by the observational network;
whether the hazard product was accurate, inaccurate, or

IMC Encounters
In nine of the 12 IMC encounters, the hazard was
detected by the observational network.  An AIRMET
was in effect for the route/time of flight in nine of 12
cases, and there were radar echoes observed at the en-

We employed all of the data collected to categorize the
weather hazard encounter into one of the four categories
listed above. These data included the METARs, TAFs,
AIR/SIGMETs, NEXRAD echoes, and pilot reports
(PIREPs) of the hazard. The following analysis outlines
the results of our employment of the weather categories
described above through construction of a weather encounter matrix for the 24 cases. 

5

counter location in six of the cases. For the three cases in
which the hazard was classified as “not detected” by the
observational network, it was the team’s opinion that the
official products did not capture the hazard, and while
NEXRAD echoes were present in two of those cases, it
would not have been sufficient for the pilot to realize
the IMC hazard was present. Of the 12 IMC cases, five
involved multiple hazards.
Icing Encounters
For nine of the 10 icing encounters, a hazard was detected by the observational network. An AIRMET was
in effect in six cases, and radar echoes were present in six
cases. Four of these cases were also IMC encounters. In
the four cases where an AIRMET was not issued, icing
PIREPs were reported in three. In the one case where
the hazard was not detected, the only evidence the pilot
would have had was from his data-linked NEXRAD; this
case had AIRMETs out for MTOS, IFR, and moderate
turbulence, but not icing. 
Non-Convective Turbulence Encounter
Only one non-convective turbulence encounter was
reported, and this case was also an IMC encounter. This
case did not have an AIRMET along the route/time of
flight, and although there were some NEXRAD echoes
observed in the vicinity of location of the encounter, the
team thought it insufficient to identify the hazard, so we
classified it as “not detected” by the observational network. 
Convective Weather Encounters
Four cases had a thunderstorm at the time and location
of the encounter. Two of these cases also had turbulence,
and two had both convective SIGMETs and radar echoes. 
Two of the convective weather cases were encounters
that took place in the approach/landing phase of the
flights and were cases in which the pilots landed at the
same time that a thunderstorm reached the airfield. Our
analysis of these four cases revealed that the hazard was
detected in all of them, but in one case the latency of
the real-time, data-linked NEXRAD data was an issue
(hence the classification as “inaccurate product”). Two
of the convective cases offer illustrative lessons about the
use of real-time weather data on the flight deck and will
be discussed in a later section.

MVFR Encounters
Two cases were encounters where the pilot experienced decreasing visibility that was tending towards IFR
but had not yet reached that threshold. In one of these
cases, there were both an IFR AIRMET and Convective SIGMET issued for the time and location of the
encounter. In the second case, there were no advisories,
but NEXRAD echoes were observed at the time and
location of the encounter. We chose to classify this case
as “hazard detected” and “product accurate” because of
the NEXRAD evidence and the presence of cloud layers
was predicted by a product known as an area forecast,
which we will discuss in the next section. 

Discussion
Available Weather Information
As described earlier, one reason for examining data
sources in addition to METARs and TAFs is to help
compare the information the pilot possessed with the
information available during the time of the encounter. 
The results of the interviews indicated that, in the majority
of cases, more data products were available during flight
preparation than what the pilot had actually obtained. 
Regarding the weather information sources used, statistics gathered from the individual interviews (Figure 3)
indicated that pilots regularly consulted the FAA Direct
User Access Terminal System (DUATS, 54.5%), the
National Weather Service (NWS, 72.7%), or a Flight
Service Station (FSS, 77.3%) to obtain weather information during pre-flight planning.
The importance of obtaining updated weather conditions enroute is particularly important in convective
weather situations, which develop rapidly and cause
problems even if a pilot has access to real-time weather
radar in the cockpit. Although the availability of NEXRAD
data in the cockpit has the potential to improve a pilot’s
situational awareness, the user needs to be aware of its
limitations (e.g., data latency as long as 7-8 minutes, and
incomplete vertical scans, both of which could be critical
in situations of rapid thunderstorm cell growth). In such
cases, the availability of real-time weather radar data can
produce a false sense of security (see, for example, the
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Figure 3. Weather provider sources used by interviewees on the day of encounter (light shading)
and routinely (dark shading).
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4. Panel a: Convective SIGMETs issued for one of our convective encounter
cases. Route of flight begins with white ‘x’ and is shown by white dashed line with arrow.
Location of encounter was approximately halfway through the flight and is also indicated
with a white ‘x.’ Panel b: Radar summary (composite reflectivity) for one of the four
convective cases in our interview sample. Location of encounter is enclosed by white
circle.

(a)

(b)

Figure 5. Panel a: Convective SIGMETs issued. The encounter location (shown by white circle) is just
outside the eastern SIGMET boundary. We counted this as a “SIGMET = No” case; however, there
were AIRMETs issued for IFR and turbulence during this time and location (not shown). Panel b:
“Zoom-in” of radar summary (composite reflectivity) with encounter location shown by white circle (note
that the horizontal area encompassed by panel ‘b’ is much smaller than the area shown in panel ‘a’).
We counted this as a “Radar = Yes” case.

discussion in Beringer & Ball, 2004). Figures 4a and 4b
illustrate the Convective SIGMETs and radar summary
data from one of the four convective weather cases in
our sample. An examination of Figure 4a shows that all
four SIGMETs were in effect over a portion of the flight
route, but only one was valid for the actual location of the
weather encounter. That final SIGMET, which included
the encounter location, was issued a mere 30 minutes after
the time of the weather encounter. However, the radar
summary shown in Figure 4b was classified as “Radar =
No” because examination of the available data showed
that the location of the encounter was very close but not

covered by the radar.  Another of the convective cases
was similar, in that while there was not a Convective
SIGMET covering the exact area of the encounter, the
advisory’s eastern boundary was particularly close to the
encounter location, except this time there was extensive
radar echo coverage in the vicinity (Figure 5). This pilot
also had access to near real-time weather radar data in the
cockpit but may not have known there was a Convective
SIGMET so close to the area in which he was flying. 
Both of these cases illustrate the difficulties involved with
making real-time decisions regarding convective weather
avoidance while in flight. 
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As alluded to earlier, one additional type of aviation
weather forecast product was added to the analysis late
in the study, primarily to examine the IMC and MVFR
cases in more detail. This product was the area forecast
(product designator “FA”), a text-based discussion of
current and predicted cloud cover, bases, tops, and ceiling/visibility across a geographic region. An example of
an FA product is shown in Figure 6. We looked at this
product because it includes information applicable to
all phases of flight, since it describes cloud cover, bases,
and tops. In four of the 12 IMC cases, the FA would
have provided additional information to the pilot during
pre-flight planning, although it is unknown if it would
have prevented the encounter. In the one MVFR case,
we believe it would have made a difference, in that it
provided evidence of deteriorating conditions at cruise
altitude. However, as seen in the example from Figure 6,
this completely textual product is verbose and is not easily
useable for enroute flight-deck application unless there
is a two-pilot crew to minimize “head down” time. Even
in a one-pilot configuration, the text product would still
have to be read over the radio by a FSS specialist, which
is not as efficient as a short glance at a graphical product.
The point of the preceding discussion is that there are
additional data sources to be utilized throughout a flight. 
Additionally, one does not necessarily need real-time,
data-linked weather radar data to have good situational

awareness of the current and predicted weather. A good
example of this last point came from another of our
convective cases, in which the weather encounter occurred upon arrival at destination. Investigation of the
weather for this case revealed that the destination TAF
had been updated multiple times for thunderstorms during the course of the flight, each time with more refined
information about the timing and potential wind gusts. 
Although flight experience varied among the interviewees, the median for this group was 1,100 total hours (range
was from 130 to 20,000). Additionally, all pilots had a
basic pilot certification of Airplane Single Engine Land,
and were medically certified to fly. Over half (60.0%) held
a Class III (private pilot only) medical certificate, with the
remaining pilots holding either a Class II (commercial,
non-airline duties, and private pilot, 24.0%) or Class I
(scheduled airline) medical certificate (16%). Additionally, most of the pilots (76.0%) were instrument rated.
Based on the results of our analyses, we found
that the weather hazard had been detected by the
observational network during the time of flight in
24 of the 29 hazards encountered. Of these 24, we
could find only one case where the resulting weather
hazard product could be considered “inaccurate”
(due to NEXRAD data latency). If warning signs of
potentially harmful weather were present, but the
pilots did not expect to be negatively impacted, then

FAUS42 KKCI 171845
FA2W
MIAC FA 171845
SYNOPSIS AND VFR CLDS/WX
SYNOPSIS VALID UNTIL 181300
CLDS/WX VALID UNTIL 180700...OTLK VALID 180700-181300
NC SC GA FL AND CSTL WTRS E OF 85W
.
SEE AIRMET SIERRA FOR IFR CONDS AND MTN OBSCN.
TS IMPLY SEV OR GTR TURB SEV ICE LLWS AND IFR CONDS.
NON MSL HGTS DENOTED BY AGL OR CIG.
.
SYNOPSIS...HI PRES RDG OVR SWRN VA-SERN NC BY 13Z OVR SERN VACNTRL NC. QUASI STNR FNT XTRM SRN FL AND WTRS MOVG NWD AS WRMFNT
AND BY 13Z CSTL PNHDL-CNTRL PEN-SRN FL WTRS. BY 13Z CDFNT WL MOV
OVR WRN FL PNHDL WTRS.
.
NC
APLCNS...SCT120 BKN CI. 06Z SRN PTN BKN150 TOP FL250. OTLK...VFR
10Z XTRM SRN PTN MVFR CIG SHRASN.
PIEDMONT...SCT-BKN CI. 03Z SCT150 BKN CI. OTLK...VFR.
CSTL PLAINS...SCT CI. BECMG 0305 SCT150 BKN CI OCNL SCT100.
OTLK...VFR.
Figure 6. Example of Area Forecast product from the National Weather Service’s Aviation Weather
Center (http://aviationweather.gov/products/fa/).
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Figure 7. Encounter model developed from this study.

what caused this apparent disconnect? Perhaps the
pilots either: 1) did not procure all of the appropriate weather information products during preflight
preparation and therefore were not completely aware of
the potential hazards, or 2) procured the appropriate
weather information products but misinterpreted the
data, leading them to believe that the weather would
be less hazardous than it actually was. 
To investigate this further, the team developed an
integrated encounter model that examined the weather
factors described in Table 4 and human causal factors
(called Pilot Factors4 in Figure 7). The model outlines
five weather pre-conditions, four pilot factors, and two
potential outcomes. Using this model, we first looked
at whether the flight weather hazard was detected by
the observational network.  In this case, detection
means that there is sufficient evidence of a flight
weather hazard through METARs, TAFs, PIREPs,
AIR/SIGMETs, Area Forecasts, and to a lesser degree,
the NEXRAD data. Next, we determined if products
were available that could capture the location, timing,
and intensity of the weather hazard. An inaccurate
weather hazard product underestimates severity and/or
does not capture the timing or location of the hazard

accurately. Just because the hazard is “detected” does
not mean that an advisory product would have to be
accurate. We then determined if the pilot avoided the
weather hazard. A pilot could avoid a weather hazard
if he/she knew the location of a hazardous airspace
and successfully avoided it or was simply fortunate
enough not to encounter it. 
Technically, any of these five Weather Preconditions can eventually lead to either a weather
encounter/incident or no incident, the latter being
true if a pilot successfully avoids a weather hazard. 
The four Pilot Factors were then used to analyze the
cause of the weather encounter/incident. It is technically possible for a pilot to experience one of the Pilot
Factors and successfully avoid a weather hazard; this
information would not be discoverable unless the
pilot documented it somehow. In all of our 24 cases,
the result was a weather encounter/incident due to
one of these four Pilot Factors. The model in Figure
7 is meant to include all of the possible results that
could exist.

4

Shappell et al. (2010) described the process for classifying the 24
interview cases into one of the four pilot factors using a combination
of the interview data and narrative summaries of the encounters (see
their Discussion, pp.9-12). 
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Table 5. Weather and Pilot Factor Model Applied to this Study.
Hazard

Weather Preconditions

Product Examples

Pilot Factors from Interviews

Hazard /
# cases

Obs
Network
detected
Y/N

Wx
Product(s)
accurate /
inaccurate
/ nonexistent

AIR/SIGMET
issued for time
/ location of
encounter

Lack of
Apprec /
Understand
Wx

IMC
12 cases

9 – Yes
3 – No

9/0/3

9

6

Icing
10 cases

9 – Yes
1 – No

9/0/1

6

Nonconvect
turbc
1 case

0 – Yes
1 – No

0/0/1

Convect
Wx
4 cases
(note 1)

4 – Yes
0 – No

MVFR
2 cases
(note 2)
Total
29 cases
(note 3)

NEXRAD
echoes at
time /
location of
encounter

Motivation

Conflicting
Wx Info

Lack of
Complete
Wx Info

5

4

0

1

6

6

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

3/1/0

3

1

4

0

0

0

2 – Yes
0 – No

2/0/0

1

0

1

1

0

0

24 – Yes
5 – No

23 / 1 / 5

19

14

16

6

1

2

Note 1: Two of the four convective cases included turbulence, so these are characterized as convectively induced turbulence
Note 2: “MVFR” refers to cases where in-flight visibility was reduced to 3-5 miles, so not technically IFR
Note 3: Total cases > # of interview cases because some were multiple-hazard encounters

Weather Education and Training
The training requirements for weather hazards from Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 61.105
states that private pilot applicants “must receive and log
ground training from an authorized instructor or complete
a home-study course on […] recognition of critical weather
situations from the ground and in flight, windshear avoidance,
and the procurement and use of aeronautical weather reports
and forecasts” (FAA, 2005b). Visual Flight Rules-only pilots
are also given some instrument flight training as a precaution,
so they can “maintain control of an aircraft while making a
course reversal or diversion if they inadvertently enter clouds”
(NTSB, 2005). In addition, 14 CFR 61.65 states, “a person
who applies for an instrument rating must have received
and logged ground training from an authorized instructor
or accomplished a home-study course on […] procurement
and use of aviation weather reports and forecasts and the
elements of forecasting weather trends based on that information and personal observation of weather conditions [and
on] recognition of critical weather situations and windshear
avoidance” (FAA, 2005a). According to the NTSB (2005), “for
instrument-rated pilots, this training is meant to provide the
additional knowledge and skills needed for safe flight in IMC.”

Table 5 expands on the results presented in Table 4
by summarizing the results of our study using the encounter model described in Figure 7. Three important
observations can be drawn from the table. First, in over
80% of the cases, the weather hazards were detected by
the observational network. Second, in nearly 80% of the
cases, aviation weather hazard products, whether AIR/
SIGMETs, NEXRAD data, METARs, TAFs, or FAs,
were available for the area and time of the encounter. 
Third, over half of the pilot factors were attributable to
the pilot’s lack of appreciation for the weather. The results
of our analysis using the model suggest that, whatever the
reason for the weather encounter, better education and
training regarding proper awareness of weather hazards
information and increased emphasis on availability and
appropriate use of hazards products during different
phases of flight may prevent the occurrence of similar
weather incidents. This point is discussed in greater detail
in the following section.
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A valid question to ask, then, is: How does one adequately educate and train a pilot applicant to ensure that
the aforementioned requirements are met? There appears
to be no standard for educating pilots on meteorology
and training them on the proper use of weather products
and reliable information sources. In fact, the only hazard
specifically discussed in the regulations cited above is wind
shear. Regulations require that ground training must be
logged, or that a home-study course must be completed
(FAA, 2005b), but there are no requirements for the
amount of time to be spent on meteorology or what
information should be covered. Both the Aeronautical
Information Manual (AIM; FAA, 2008) and Aviation
Weather Services (Aviation Circular AC 00-45G; FAA,
2010) include descriptions of useful products and sources
of information. While both documents detail many of
these products, there are no specifics on what is required
to be taught. It is unclear whether pilots are sufficiently
trained to interpret weather products or if they are
taught just enough to pass an examination. Should the
latter case be true, then it is possible that after the exam
is passed, a pilot may rarely consult some or all of these
weather products due to an incomplete understanding
of their importance during initial training. Further, the
NTSB (2005) pointed out that a pilot can theoretically
get all aviation weather questions wrong on an airman
knowledge test, yet still pass the exam. The NTSB also
noted that during the required biennial flight review
(BFR), “the instructor giving the flight review is free to
determine the content; therefore, the BFR may or may
not include a demonstration of the weather knowledge
and instrument flight skills required for initial certification” (p. 9). Therefore, it is possible that after becoming
certified, a pilot may not be required to demonstrate
knowledge on some aviation-specific weather information products again.
Regarding weather products and en route sources used,
all of the pilots in our study mentioned METARs and
TAFs for both the departure and destination locations. 
However, only a fraction mentioned obtaining services
for getting updated information in-flight (also, see Figure
2 in Shappell et al. 2010). It is possible that these pilots
may not look at these products regularly, or may not be
as familiar with them as they should be. Regardless, it is
clear that pilots frequent a variety of sources to procure
weather data, in part because “Part 91 regulations do not
specify a particular source of weather information for
GA pilots” (NTSB, 2005, pp. 11-12). The downside is
that, without standardization of products and sources, it
is possible that GA pilots may not be receiving the best
data available.

Conclusions and
Recommendations
Although our 24-case study interviews constitute
a small sample, we believe that these encounters have
highlighted deficiencies in pilot education, training, and
skills when confronting various weather conditions. Although we are unable to conduct rigorous statistical tests
with the small interview sample size, the results of this
study show that there is indeed room for improvement
regarding preparation for weather encounters. As such, it
is likely representative of deficiencies throughout the GA
community. Additionally, the results from the interviews
can be combined with those from the data-mining study
(Figures 1 and 2) to determine which types of weather
information are most critical to GA pilots during different phases of flight.
Another result from the interview portion of the study
was the critical role played by air traffic control specialists
(ATCSs) in the flight assists. It should be noted that the
roles of controllers and management will evolve under the
Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen),
and the GA community needs to be prepared to deal with
unexpected weather encounters in a system where ATC
may be playing a much different role than they play today.
We suggest that weather education and product training be standardized and taught to pilot applicants. Below,
we summarize our recommendations for the content of
initial training so that all pilots can have a more thorough
understanding of weather hazards before they leave the
ground. An appreciation and understanding of these hazards are likely to lead to better pilot decision making and
judgment. The summary includes steps that are already
being implemented (i.e., maneuvers to take if weather is
encountered), as well as steps that are not currently part
of the standard procedure.
Summary recommendation: All pilot applicants should
receive and log no less than a specified minimum number
of hours of ground training focused solely on weather. An
authorized instructor, not in-home study courses, should
give this ground training. Our recommendations for the
content of the training are listed below:
An introduction to in-flight weather hazards should
be given, to include, but not be limited to: 1) IMC; 2)
convective weather; 3) icing; 4) turbulence; and 5) wind
shear.  Pilots should be made aware of the significant
impact that any of these hazards can have and be trained
to avoid them at all costs. 
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Appendix A – Sample Weather Products Lists
[Ref: FAA-S-8081-14A With Change 1, Private Pilot Practical Test Standards for Airplane (SEL,
MEL, SES, MES), August 2002, Flight Standards Service, Washington, DC 20591]
C. TASK: WEATHER INFORMATION (ASEL and ASES)
REFERENCES: 14 CFR part 91; AC 00-6, AC 00-45, AC 61-23/FAA-H-8083-25, AC 61-84; AIM.
Objective. To determine that the applicant:
1. Exhibits knowledge of the elements related to weather information by analyzing weather reports, charts, and
forecasts from various sources with emphasis on— (product listing italicized by authors)
a. METAR, TAF, and FA.
b. surface analysis chart.
c. radar summary chart.
d. winds and temperature aloft chart.
e. significant weather prognostic charts.
f. convective outlook chart.
g. AWOS, ASOS, and ATIS reports.
2. Makes a competent “go/no-go” decision based on available weather information.

(Ref: FAA-S-8081-4D, Instrument Rating Practical Test Standards for Airplane, Helicopter,
Powered Lift, April 2004, Flight Standards Service, Washington, DC 20591)
I. AREA OF OPERATION: PREFLIGHT PREPARATION
A. TASK: WEATHER INFORMATION
REFERENCES: 14 CFR part 61; AC 00-6, AC 00-45; AIM.
NOTE: Where current weather reports, forecasts, or other pertinent information is not available, this information
will be simulated by the examiner in a manner that will adequately measure the applicant's competence.
Objective. To determine that the applicant:
1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to aviation weather information by obtaining, reading, and
analyzing the applicable items, such as— (product listing italicized by authors)
weather reports and forecasts.
pilot and radar reports.
surface analysis charts.
radar summary charts.
significant weather prognostics.
winds and temperatures aloft.
freezing level charts.
stability charts.
severe weather outlook charts.
SIGMETs and AIRMETs.
ATIS reports.
2. Correctly analyzes the assembled weather information pertaining to the proposed route of flight and destination
airport, and determines whether an alternate airport is required, and, if required, whether the selected alternate
airport meets the regulatory requirement.
1-1 FAA-S-8081-4D
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